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Executive Summary 
 
We estimate the impact of compulsory schooling on earnings using the changes in 
compulsory schooling laws for secondary schools in West German states during the 
period from 1948 to 1970.  The German school system streams students into three 
separate types of secondary schools and the change in compulsory schooling laws 
affected students in the lowest level stream.  There is a sizeable literature studying the 
returns to compulsory schooling for other countries, including the UK.  These studies 
typically indicate returns in the range of 10 to 15 percent for every additional year an 
individual stays in school  in response to a raising of the school leaving age.  While 
our research design is very similar to many of these previous studies, we find very 
different estimates of the returns.   We find no return to compulsory schooling in 
Germany in terms of higher wages. 
 
There are various possible explanations for the different returns in Germany, which 
we discuss in the paper.  One possibility is that returns are low because of wage 
rigidity. Institutions like union wage setting may prevent the emergence of sufficient 
wage differentials.  In order to investigate this possibility we also look at the 
employment effects of the change in compulsory schooling.  If firms cannot 
differentiate wages sufficiently by skill, they should be more interested in hiring the 
more skilled workers (in this case the ones with more schooling).  We find no 
evidence for this.  We also find no evidence for any returns among the self-employed, 
who should not be subject to institutional wage rigidities.  A second possibility is that 
an additional year of schooling matters less because of the existence of the 
apprenticeship training system in Germany.  We also find no evidence for this 
explanation by looking at the returns for school leavers, who do not get any post-
compulsory training or schooling. 
 
We conjecture that the different returns in Germany may be due to the fact that the 
basic skills most relevant for the labor market are learned earlier in Germany than in 
other countries.  We present some evidence that the school leavers affected by the law 
change only tend to use very basic academic skills in their jobs, and that Germans 
typically score relatively well in international comparison tests on those types of 
skills.  This is true in particular in comparison with the Anglo-Saxon countries, where 
returns to compulsory schooling are high.  Hence, returns to compulsory schooling 
may be low in Germany because the school system is (or has been) rather successful 
in endowing students with the skills relevant for the labor market. 
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1 Introduction
Compulsory schooling laws have been used extensively in the recent litera-
ture to estimate the returns to schooling. Starting with Angrist and Krueger
(1991), this research has shown that the returns to schooling are substantial
for those individuals leaving school at or near the drop-out age. The re-
turns also tend to be higher than those found by standard OLS regressions.
This finding has been replicated for many countries, raising the question
whether returns to compulsory schooling are universally high, irrespective
of national labor market institutions or schooling systems. However, lit-
tle is known about how these institutional factors influence the returns to
schooling.
In this paper, we investigate the returns to a change in compulsory
schooling laws in Germany. The lowest level of German secondary school
used to end after grade 8 after World War II. Soon after the war, some states
started to add a compulsory 9th grade for students in this type of school.
The 9th grade was introduced at various times in the different states, and it
took until 1970 before it was universally in place. This creates ample within
state variation to identify the effects of the introduction of the 9th grade
on education and earning using a differences-in-differences strategy. The
German law changes give rise to a research design that is very similar to that
employed by Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) for the US and by Oreopoulos
(2003) for the US, Canada, and the UK.
We find that the returns to compulsory schooling are basically zero in
Germany. The effects of the 9th grade introduction on earnings are precisely
estimated. On the other hand, it is more difficult to determine the effect of
the law change on the amount of schooling actually received by individuals
in the German context. Our estimate of a one year extension in mandatory
schooling for some students on the actual schooling obtained by all students
is only 0.17 years, although about 60 percent of students should be fully
affected. We argue that this small estimate reflects partly the fact that the
9th grade introduction was not completely sudden in all states, as well as
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attenuation due to measurement error in our schooling variables. However,
the ratio of the two estimates results in the standard instrumental variables
estimate, which is not subject to measurement error. Our final estimates
can safely rule out any returns of the size of the OLS estimates.
Why should the returns to schooling be zero or small in Germany, when
returns in the order of 10 to 15 percent are found for other countries? We
discuss a variety of potential explanations for our results. One possibility is
that the low returns are due to rigid wages in Germany. We look at effects
on employment and on the self-employed in order to examine this possibility,
but we find no support for this idea. Another potential explanation is based
on the role of the German apprenticeship training system, which clearly plays
an important role in providing labor market relevant skills. This may reduce
the role of secondary schooling for apprenticeship trained workers. However,
we find no wage effects for the group of workers who never completed an
apprenticeship either.
The high returns found for the US have often been attributed to com-
pulsory schooling mostly affecting high return individuals, who also have
high costs of schooling. We argue that this reasoning cannot be used to ex-
plain the stark differences in the patterns of returns to schooling we find for
Germany without taking into account more fundamental differences in the
schooling systems. In particular, while it is possible to argue that due to
the nature of the school system many low returns individuals are affected by
the change in compulsory schooling laws in Germany, the same should also
be true for the UK, which had a very similar system at the times when the
school leaving age was raised. We feel that the most likely explanation of
our results has to do with the fact that German students were much better
prepared in basic academic skills by the time they reach grade 9, while the
same is not true in many other countries including the UK. We argue that
it is those skills which matter ultimately in the labor market for the target
population.
Angrist and Krueger (1991) were the first to use compulsory schooling
laws to estimate the returns to schooling. By exploiting the features of US
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compulsory schooling laws, they estimate the effects of compulsory schooling
within a state and cohort, without making use of changes in compulsory
schooling laws. They find returns in the order of 7.5 percent, not very
different from the OLS estimates.
Subsequent studies typically used actual changes in compulsory schooling
laws. Harmon and Walker (1995) investigate the effect of the extensions
of the school leaving age in Britain in 1947 and 1973. They report much
higher returns of 15 percent, which is far above the OLS estimate. These
results may be questioned on the grounds that they do not control fully for
cohort effects.1
Their results are corroborated by Orepoulos (2003), who adds a compar-
ison between England and Wales, on the one hand, and Northern Ireland,
which changed school leaving ages at different times. Oreopoulos also com-
pares these results to state level changes in compulsory schooling laws in
the US, and for province level changes in Canada. For all countries, the
estimated returns are in the order of 10 to 15 percent, and typically above
the OLS estimates. Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) also report estimates
using changes in US compulsory schooling laws. Their estimates are only
in the vicinity of 10 percent, closer to the OLS estimates, and lower than
those reported by Oreopoulos (2003).
Changes in compulsory schooling in nordic countries were studied by
Meghir and Palme (2004) for Sweden, and by Aakvik, Salvanes, and Vaage
(2003) for Norway. The changes in both countries raised compulsory school-
ing from 7 grades to 9, and were implemented at different times in different
municipalities. However, the extensions of compulsory schooling in both
countries were part of broader reforms of the school systems, moving from
selective secondary schooling to a comprehensive system, for example. This
makes the interpretation of the effects as returns to schooling more difficult.
Interpreting the earnings impact of these reforms as returns to education
yields sizeable estimates in both countries, despite the fact that these coun-
1They control for survey year and a quadratic effect in age, and, hence, for a linear
effect in birth cohort.
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tries have more regulated labor markets than the Anglo-Saxon countries.
For Norway, Aakvik et al. (2003) report a return of 10 percent for year
of education, while the Meghir and Palme (2004) results imply a return of
0.18.2 While some features of the results, particularly in the Swedish case,
suggest that these results do not identify purely the returns to compulsory
schooling, the authors effectively do not offer an alternative explanation.
Two other recent studies, however, find low returns using difference-in-
difference analyses of changes in compulsory schooling rules in European
countries. Grenet (2004) evaluates the impact of a reform in the French
schooling system in 1967, which raised the school leaving age from 14 to
16. Grenet compares students from advantaged and disadvantaged family
background because the French reform was at the national level, and finds
returns of 3 to 5 percent, below the OLS returns of 7.5 percent in his sample.
Oosterbeek and Webbing (2004) analyze the extension of some vocational
training programs in the Netherlands from three to four years of length.
Because there were pre-existing programs with four years in length, this
study compares graduates from the programs which were extended to those
whose length stayed the same. Oosterbeek and Webbing generally find
small, and sometimes negative effects for the participants of the extended
programs.
The previous IV studies of the returns to education for Germany by
Ichino and Winter-Ebmer (1999, 2004) and Becker and Siebern-Thomas
(2001) use very different instruments from compulsory schooling laws. The
instrument in Ichino and Winter-Ebmer is the exposure of German cohorts
to disruptions in schooling during World War II. Becker and Siebern-
Thomas use the schooling infrastructure in the region where an individual
grew up as instrument. Both of these instruments will pick out differences
in secondary schooling. In the German context, these differences eventually
tend to imply that an individual either obtains lower secondary schooling
plus an apprenticeship or a higher secondary degree plus academic educa-
2Meghir and Palme (2004) only report reduced form results. The estimate of 0.18 can
be obtained as the indirect least squares (IV) estimate from their results.
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tion. All three studies find larger returns to education than by using OLS,
in the order of 10 percent.
The impact of compulsory schooling laws in Germany is of substantial
interest not only because the earnings effects differ so much from the preced-
ing literature on this topic. The German schooling and vocational training
system, the structure of the labor market, and the distribution of skills
among school leavers is different than in some of the other countries where
the impact of compulsory schooling changes have been analyzed. Hence,
our paper helps to advance our understanding which of these factors might
be important in explaining high or low returns to compulsory schooling for
particular populations.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section dis-
cusses the relevant aspects of the schooling and training system in Germany,
while section 3 describes the datasets used. Section 4 presents the empirical
results and discusses some estimation problems. Section 5 discusses various
possible explanations for the results and section 6 concludes.
2 The German schooling and training system
Children usually start school in Germany in the year after they turn six and
attend a four year primary school. After grade four, the German school
system tracks students into three types of secondary schools, which distin-
guish themselves by the academic content of the curriculum. The lowest
level or basic track of secondary school (Hauptschule), leads to a school leav-
ing certificate after grade 8 or 9, although some students leave without the
qualifications for the certificate. The curriculum in this school has some vo-
cational content, and is supposed to prepare students for an apprenticeship.
The middle track (Realschule) ends after grade 10 and is more academically
rigorous than the basic track. Middle track students also typically enter an
apprenticeship or a school based vocational training after finishing school.
The most academic track, Gymnasium, leads to a university entrance exam
(Abitur) after grade 13 or a lower level qualification after grade 12, called
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Fachhochschulreife, which allows school leavers to attend a polytechnic.
Initially after World War II, about 75 percent of secondary graduates
would have attended the basic track in secondary school. The higher
level tracks expanded rapidly from the 1950s through the 1970s, as figure
1 demonstrates. This figure plots the shares in each school type for the
cohorts born from 1925 to 1970.3
Students in the different secondary school tracks will attend a different
school depending which track they are in. The placement in one of these
types of schools tends to be permanent, and few students move between
school types (particularly in the upward direction). Selection into the dif-
ferent types of secondary school depends on a combination of formal exams,
primary school grades, recommendations by the primary school teacher, and
parental choice. The exact mechanisms differ from state (Bundesland) to
state and over time. The first two years in secondary school are often re-
garded as an orientation phase, allowing transitions between the different
school types. Some states do not even distinguish explicitly between basic
and middle school until grade 7. There is significant selection into school
types by academic ability and parental background (see e.g. Dustmann,
2004). This implies that basic school students tend to be the lowest ability
students, and they also face the least challenging curriculum.4
Education policies are set by the individual states within framework
agreements, which ensure that the school systems in all states remain com-
parable enough. Basic school used to last up to grade 8 before World War
II. Hamburg and Berlin were the first states to introduce a 9th grade in
1949. During the immediate post-war period, lack of labor market oppor-
tunities and apprenticeships for school leavers were important arguments in
3This figure was constructed using the QaC sample described below. The shares in
the graph are a five year moving average.
4In addition to the three selective types of schools, some states also offer comprehensive
schools, where students can obtain all the possible school leaving degrees without making
a decision at age 10 or 11. Numerically, these schools are not very important. In addition,
completing the requisite grade in a higher level school typically allows students to leave
school with a lower level school leaving certificate. For example, students in middle school
can leave with a basic school certificate by passing grade 9.
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the debate about the introduction of the 9th grade. Petzold (1981) claims
that the labor market argument was widely used by the government, politi-
cal parties, and employer associations at that time. Some states introduced
a mandatory 9th grade on a temporary basis during the early 1950s. For
example, Niedersachsen had laws from 1950 to 1955 allowing the education
minister to mandate 9th grade attendance by county or town. Bavaria had
a similar law in 1952. Other states introduced the 9th grade on an ex-
perimental basis. Two northern states, Schleswig-Holstein and Bremen,
permanently introduced the 9th grade in the late 1950s.
By that time, labor market arguments were not the main driving force in
the political discussion anymore. According to Petzold (1981), the reasoning
had shifted to educational arguments (14 year olds are not mature enough for
the labor market, and school still has an important role to play at that age)
and the growing skill needs of the economy. LeSchinsky (1981) mirrors the
assessment that the extension of compulsory schooling was mainly used to
raise educational standards in the basic school track. He also points out that
employers at the time stressed the necessity of thorough training in the basic
skills, reading, writing, and arithmetic. Two other states, Niedersachsen
and Saarland, introduced the 9th grade in this general enviroment during the
first half of the 1960s. In the 1964 Hamburg Accord, an agreement struck
by the prime ministers of the states, all states agreed that the basic school
track should last up to 9th grade starting in 1967. Four states introduced
the 9th grade in 1967, although this was not done in Bavaria until 1970.
Table 1 shows the dates for each state we use in the analysis, as well as our
assignment of the first birth cohort, which should have been affected by the
change.5
The content of the curricula for the additional 9th grade differ some-
what between states. Nordrhein-Westfalen (1962) reports that Berlin used
the 9th grade primarily for political education, while Bremen stressed “gen-
5In four states, which introduced the 9th grade in 1966-67, the introduction coincided
with the short school years due to a transition in the start of the school year (see Pischke,
2003, for details). This is reflected in the assignments of the birth cohort.
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eral knowledge.” In Niedersachsen, the curriculum was centred around three
goals: the consolidation of basic skills, to give students access to the adult
world and teach political responsibility, and to acquaint school leavers with
the world of work.6
After completing the basic or middle track, students typically enter a
firm- or school-based vocational training course, most commonly an appren-
ticeship. In addition to the firm based training, an apprentice will attend
a part-time vocational school. Compulsory schooling does not necessarily
end in Germany with the completion of secondary school but extends to a
part-time vocational school. Hence, school leavers cannot generally take up
a job that is not part of an apprenticeship program.
The apprenticeship training is highly regulated. There are nationally
agreed curricula for the apprenticeship occupations. Training firms are over-
seen by the chambers of commerce and crafts, who also carry out the grad-
uation exams for the apprentices. Apprentices obtain an allowance, which
differs by occupation, and is about a third of the unskilled wage. The
allowance is negotiated in union wage bargains.
According to our data, workers obtained many of the skills they actually
use on their job during their apprenticeship training (with other important
sources being further on-the-job training and work experience). Appren-
ticeship training (and sometimes further vocational qualifications, like the
Meister certificate) is often necessary for entry into certain skilled jobs,
self-employment, and in order to reach certain pay grades. Pay tends to
be highly regulated in Germany, particularly in firms subject to collective
bargaining.
Instead of pursuing an apprenticeship, school leavers may also receive
vocational training in full-time vocational schools, or attend such schools in
6Some states also started offering an optional 10th grade for basic school students after
introducing a 9th grade, although this did not become important until the 1970s. The
10th grade in the basic track of secondary school allows students to obtain the 10th grade
certificate typically received after attending the middle track. In addition, it is often
chosen as an option by students who do not find an apprenticeship immediately after 9th
grade.
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order to obtain a higher level academic credential. Those school leavers
who fail to find an apprenticeship are typically channeled into various types
of preparatory vocational programs, in order to give them another attempt
at finding an apprenticeship the following year. School leavers very rarely
take unskilled jobs right after leaving school.
3 The data
The data are taken from three data sets. The first is the Qualification and
Career Survey (QaC) collected by the Institut fu¨r Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufs-
forschung (IAB) and the Bundesinstitut fu¨r Berufsbildung (BIBB). The QaC
is a repeated cross section of employed workers of German nationality in the
age group 15 to 65. We use the four waves for 1979, 1985-86, 1991-92, and
1998-99 each of which samples about 25,000 workers. The second data set
is the Micro Census, an annual survey of 1 percent of the households in Ger-
many. We use the surveys from 1989, 1991, 1993, and all years from 1995
to 2001. Each wave has about 300,000 to 400,000 observations for the west
German states. The third data set comes from social security data, and
is based on the IAB Employee Sample (IAB Bescha¨ftigtenstichprobe), a 1
percent sample of social security records for 1975 to 1995. The samples used
below contain the cohorts living in the 10 west German states (excluding
Berlin), who are born from 1930 to 1960.
The Qualification and Career Survey is appealing despite the smaller
sample size because it contains the most information on schooling. The
earnings variable in the surveys is gross monthly earnings. Respondents in
the 1979 survey were asked to report their earnings in 13 brackets, in the
1985-86 survey in 22 brackets, in 1991-92 in 15 brackets, and 1998-99 in 18
brackets. We assign each individual earnings equal to the bracket midpoint.7
7Because of the large number of brackets this is unlikely to introduce much more
measurement error than is done by respondents’ rounding continuous amounts. The top
bracket in 1979 was DM 5,000 or more which we assigned a value of DM 7,500, in 1985-86
and 1998-99 it was DM 15,000 or more which we assigned a value of DM 17,500, and in
1991-92 it was DM 8,000 or more which we assigned a value of 12,500. Only 1.8 percent
of sample observations are in the top income bracket.
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We then convert the variable to an hourly wage by dividing by the number
of weekly hours.
German data do not typically contain a variable with the number of
years of schooling or the highest grade attended. Instead, the QaC pro-
vides the year when the individual graduated from secondary school, the
highest secondary school degree attained (this basically identifies the track
attended), as well as comprehenisve information on post-secondary educa-
tional attainment and training. The typical approach to constructing years
of schooling for Germany is to assign the usual number of years taken for
an educational route. Krueger and Pischke (1995) demonstrate that OLS
returns in Germany are reasonably linear in the various credentials.
The QaC does not contain information on the state where an individual
went to school, only the current state of residence. Using this information,
the year of birth, and the information in Table 1, we imputed whether an
individual will have graduated after 8 or 9 years in the basic track. However,
since the dataset contains a variable for the secondary school graduation
year, we can also calculate a measure of the length of primary and secondary
schooling. Using the typical primary school enrollment rule (students start
school in the year after they turn 6), we calculate the length of schooling as
secondary school graduation year minus year of birth minus six.
The Micro Census is an annual representative household survey. The
Micro Census samples both employed individuals and those not working,
which allows us to look at employment in addition to earnings. The large
sample sizes also facilitate the analysis of some smaller subgroups. We
restrict the sample to those of German nationality.
There is no earnings measure on this dataset but it contains a variable
for net monthly income. Income is also reported in brackets. There were
18 brackets from 1989 to 1999, and 24 brackets in 2000 and 2001. We
assign midpoints to the brackets again.8 Despite the different concepts, this
8The top bracket in 1989 was DM 5,000 or more which we assigned a value of DM
7,500; in 1991-1999 it was DM 7,500 or more which we assigned a value of DM 10,500; in
2000 and 2001 it was DM 35,000 or more which we assigned DM 40,000.
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variable looks very much like earnings in the QaC data for employed persons.
For example, OLS returns to education are very similar. We convert the
variable to an hourly wage by dividing by the number of weekly hours.
The data also provides the highest secondary school degree attained,
and some basic information on post-secondary educational attainment and
training. We use this again, together with the number of years usually
taken to obtain a degree, to calculate a measure for years of education.
Geographical information is again limited to the state of residence.
The IAB Employee Sample (IAB Bescha¨ftigtenstichprobe) includes only
records on employed individuals, and excludes civil servants, self-employed,
and those in marginal employment because these groups are not covered by
the general social security system. This includes about 80% of all workers.
The dataset is a panel. Once sampled, an individual is followed as long as a
social security record appears for that individual. The dataset is described
in more detail in Bender and Hilzdegen (1995) and Bender, Haas, and Klose
(2000).
We obtained cell level means, medians, and standard deviations of earn-
ings, as well as characteristics of the individuals spanning the period 1975 to
1995. The sample is restricted to Germans living in the west German states.
The cells are based on year, age, state, and level of schooling. The regional
indicator is the state of the workplace. Every individual was assigned the
state where they worked in 1975 or when they first entered the dataset.
The earnings measure provided is gross pay subject to social security
contributions, and it is truncated at the social security maximum. For each
cell, we know how many observations are at the maximum, and we only
use cells where the fraction at the maximum is 50 percent or less. We
also discard 489 cells based on a single observation. The sample used in
the analysis has 12,566 cells, based on 2 to 1,447 observations. The mean
number of observations in the cells is 192, the median is 56, and the cells
are based on about 2.4 million micro records.
The advantage of the social security data is its large sample size. How-
ever, this is mitigated by the fact that it is a panel with repeated observations
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on the same individuals. Another drawback is the coarse information on
education. The data set only distinguishes students who graduated from
the academic track of secondary school, but does not allow us to distinguish
basic and middle track students. Summary statistics for our samples can
be found in Appendix table 1.
4 Empirical results
The standard approach to estimating the returns to compulsory schooling
is to run a regression with the years of schooling instrumented with an
indicator for the compulsory schooling regime. We start in table 2 by
presenting first stage regressions for this two stage least squares problem.
Recall that we do not have a direct measure of the “years of schooling”
actually attended by an individual in any of our datasets. Rather our
constructed measure of years of education assigns 8 or 9 grades to basic track
students on the basis of their year of birth, as well as assigning the years
necessary for a certain degree to the degree information. All regressions
also include a dummy for female, a quartic in age, and the maximal sets of
year dummies, state of residence dummies, and year of birth dummies.
Table 2 shows the resulting first stage regressions. In column (1) the
total number of years of schooling and training (called “years of education”)
is regressed on an indicator for whether the 9th grade in basic track has been
introduced in the student’s state of residence. Since the number of years
of secondary schooling assigns 9 years to basic track students whenever the
9th year was in place, the first stage of this regression is rather mechanical,
and the first stage coefficient should reflect the fraction of students in the
basic school track. These fractions are 60.9 and 55.1 percent in the QaC
and Micro Census, respectively. The coefficients in column (1) are similar
to these fractions, although they do not match exactly. They are closer
in column (2), where the dependent variable is limited to years of primary
and secondary schooling, excluding years of post-secondary education and
training. The fact that the results in columns (1) and (2) are very similar
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indicates that the introduction of the 9th grade in basic school did not
affect participation in post-secondary schooling and training, an issue we
will return to below.
Column (3) shows the same regression using a measure of the length of
school based on the secondary school graduation year, constructed in the
QaC data. The coefficient on this measure is only 0.17. This suggests that
even basic school students (60 percent of the sample) only increased their
schooling by about 0.28 of a year. This indicates that the introduction
of a compulsory 9th grade might not have been completely effective, or it
could reflect attenuation due to various measurement problems. It is also
important to keep in mind that the measure of the length of schooling used
here is not what is typically used in the literature. The length measure
includes grade repetition, and contains noise because some students start
school only at age 7. The typical measure of years of schooling is instead
based on the highest grade attended or completed.9
A final check in table 2 is whether the introduction of the 9th grade
affected track choice. This is not the case as can be seen in column (4) to
(6). Column (4) contains the basic specification. Column (5) adds state
specific cohort trends, and column (6) also adds quadratic trends. Students
subject to the 9th grade in basic track are slightly less likely to attend the
basic track. However, the effects are relatively small, and they are only
significant in the specification in column (6) for the Micro Census. If track
choice is largely unaffected by the 9th grade introduction, it is possible to
limit the sample to basic track students.
Table 3 shows more details for the estimates using the length of schooling
variable in the QaC by showing specifications with state specific cohort
trends, and specifications limited to students attending the basic track. The
estimates change little when state specific cohort trends are included in
columns (2) and (3). The estimates for the basic track subsample is 0.28 as
9An exception is Oreopoulos (2003) who uses school leaving age for the UK, a measure
more similar to the length measure used here. It is a valid measure of the increase in
education as long as measurement error does not vary across cohorts.
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expected (0.17 divided by 0.6). While these estimates are relatively small,
they are highly significant.
In order to investigate the magnitude of the first stage further, we plotted
the relationship between the length of schooling and the introduction of the
9th grade in figure 2. All states are pooled, and birth cohorts are aligned
with respect to the year in which the 9th grade was introduced. While a
discrete jump is apparent at the time of the treatment, there is also some
trend in the length of schooling variable. This trend emerges shortly before
the introduction of the 9th grade, and continues after the introduction. This
may indicate some mismeasurement in the exact timing of introduction date,
for example, due to early school entry, grade repetition, measurement error
in year of birth, and mobility between states. The continuing trend towards
more schooling after the introduction is most likely due to the fact that
some states also introduced an optional 10th grade in the basic track, which
necessitates the introduction of a 9th grade.
Figure 3 provides additional information on the strength of the first
stage using administrative data from the four states which introduced the
9th grade in 1966. The figure plots the average grade for school leavers from
1963 to 1967.10 It is apparent from the figure that some students attended
a 9th grade already before 1966. In 1967, slightly more than 80 percent of
the school leavers have 9 years of schooling, but a significant fraction is still
leaving school after grade 8. This demonstrates that the change in school
attendance did not happen sharply when a 9th grade was introduced for
most students. Instead, the change was spread over the adjacent years for
some students.
What the results in Figures 2 and 3 indicate is that one should not expect
a first stage coefficient of one in the subsample of basic school students.
Instead, the introduction of the 9th grade was not fully effective in a single
year, but a more spread out process. In addition, the various measurement
10No data are available for 1968 and 1969 because of a change in the computer system
of the statistical authorities. We were also unable to obtain similar data for other states,
which introduced the 9th grade earlier.
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problems mentioned above will tend to attenuate both the first stage and
reduced form coefficients. Since the relative biases in both the first stage and
reduced form coefficients will be the same, instrumental variables estimates
will be consistent despite the measurement error for the standard reasons.
Since the length of schooling variable in the QaC data is the only variable
which picks up the actual increase in duration of schooling, we will rely
heavily on presenting reduced form effects from all the data sets. However,
it should be kept in mind, that these have to be divided by the first stage
effects.
The following tables display regressions for log wages. We start in table
4 by showing some OLS specifications using the QaC and Micro Census
data. Column (1) presents a standard model with a quartic in potential
labor market experience as controls. The return to education is between 7
and 8 percent in this OLS specification. Because the 9th grade treatment is
constructed on the basis of state and year of birth, it is important to control
for state and year of birth main effects in the later regression, to use only
the within state variation in the identification. Column (2) introduces year
of birth dummies. However, controlling for experience, this is a slightly
odd specification. Age is a linear combination of survey year and year of
birth, and hence a linear term in age is simultaneously controlled for in this
regression. Column (3) replaces the experience control with age, which
makes somewhat more sense. The coefficients in these specifications are
slightly lower than in column (1). This is typically the case when experience
is replaced with age.11
Column (4) instruments the endogenous regressor, years of education,
with a dummy variable for whether the state had introduced the 9th grade
in basic track for the respective birth cohort. The coefficient now drops
basically to zero, and is insignificant. Columns (5) and (6) probe these
11To benchmark the IV estimates of the return from a 9th year of schooling, we have
also run an OLS regression of log earnings on dummies for completed years of schooling
using the length of schooling variable. The results, available from the authors, suggests
returns for the 9th grade of schooling of the same order of magnitude as the OLS returns
shown in table 4.
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results by adding a state specific cohort trend and its square to the regres-
sion. The returns to schooling estimates increase slightly, particularly when
the squared trend is included. The returns estimates are 3 percent in the
QaC data and 1 percent in the Micro Census, which are still small returns,
although both estimates are significant.
Table 5 presents reduced form estimates for the introduction of the 9th
grade for all three datasets. Here, the wage is regressed directly on the
dummy for the 9th grade introduction. For the QaC and Micro Census
data, these are standard OLS regressions. The social security earnings are
truncated at the taxable maximum. We deal with the truncation by using
an estimator similar to Powell’s (1984) censored least absolute deviations
estimator. Chamberlain (1994) suggested a version of this estimator for cell
level data. It amounts to estimating a linear regression on the cell medians
which are not subject to truncation, using the cell sizes as weights. The
standard errors are calculated using Stata’s aweight option, and clustering
the data again at the level of the state and year of birth. This accounts
nonparametrically for the serial correlation in earnings across cells due to
the fact that the same individuals are sampled repeatedly over time.12
The estimates for all three datasets are basically zero. The effect is
identified via a differences-in-differences design, because state and year of
birth effects are controlled for. It is always a worry in models like this
that other state specific trends might be correlated with the treatment. In
all datasets, the coefficients increase slightly when state specific trends are
controlled for, but for the social security data and the Micro Census these
changes are small. The QaC is the only dataset where a slightly positive and
significant effect emerges with squared state specific trends, which mirrors
the IV results in table 4. There is often a worry that changes in compulsory
schooling laws may be correlated with other changes education policies or the
behavior of individiuals, which may bias the effects of compulsory schooling
12We found in Monte Carlo experiments that this estimator for the standard errors
works very well in practice for our data design. See the appendix of Pischke (2003) for a
comparison with a more parametric estimator of the covariance matrix.
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upwards (see, for example, Lleras-Muney, 2002). The pattern in table 4
suggests the exact opposite: the introduction of the 9th grade in Germany
was, if anything, negatively correlated with other state specific trends in
wages.
We have argued above that these estimates might be affected by a variety
of measurement problems. Hence, scaling the reduced form estimates by
the first stage estimate using the length of schooling results from the QaC
is the most appropriate. For the QaC data, this is simply the instrumental
variables estimate. With quadratic state specific trends, this estimate is
0.11 with a standard error of 0.05.13 This would be a large return, and it
is in fact larger than the OLS return in the QaC data.
However, similarly large returns are not found in the other data sets.
For these datasets, we divide the reduced form results in table 5 by the
appropriate first stage estimates from the QaC in table 3. This is effectively
a two sample indirect least squares estimate. With quadratic trends, this
estimate is 0.022 in the social security data, and 0.028 in the Micro Census.
These estimates are still quite small. The standard errors on these estimates
are 0.03 for the social security data and 0.02 for the Micro Census.14 For
the Micro Census this yields a 95 percent confidence interval which ranges
up to 0.067, which is still below the OLS estimates. This indicates that the
returns to schooling estimates based on the larger datasets are small and
13This estimate can be obtained from table 3 and table 5 by dividing .019 by .18. Note
that the similar estimate for basic track students is only .043, see below.
14These standard errors are derived using the delta method. Denote the first stage
coefficient by pi, the reduced form coefficient by δ̂, and the ILS estimate by β̂. Then
var(β̂) =
1
pi2
var(δ̂) +
δ̂2
pi4
var(pi)
because pi and δ̂ are estimated from independent samples, and hence there is no covariance
term. In practice, only the first term of this expression is really going to matter because
the reduced form effects δ̂ are so small. This means, the main adjustment that has to be
made to the reduced form standard errors is to scale them up by the first stage coefficient.
The precision of our ILS estimates is slightly lower than that reported for the UK by
Harmon and Walker (1995) and for the US, Canada, and the UK by Oreopoulos (2003).
The reduced form standard errors are calculated using the cluster-command in Stata,
allowing for correlations within state and year of birth cells, the level of the treatment.
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possibly zero, and we can basically rule out effects of the size of the OLS
estimates.
An alternative way of estimating the effects of the introduction of the
9th grade is to focus on basic school students. Limiting the sample by
education is valid since the 9th grade treatment does not affect the track
attended directly. The results are shown in columns (4) to (6) of table
5. The results are again clustered around zero. In fact, the estimates are
throughout smaller than those for the full sample. This is surprising because
any positive return should be amplified in this subsample of students who
were actually affected by the policy. This is further evidence that the true
return is likely to be zero, and the relatively large estimate for the QaC data
in column (3) may be simply due to sampling variation.
In summary, the preponderance of evidence presented here suggests that
the return to compulsory schooling in Germany is small and most likely
zero. This is true although our reduced form estimates are likely affected
by various sources of measurement error. However, the same is true of the
first stage estimate using the length of schooling variable, and hence IV or
ILS estimates ought to be consistent. Measurement error can therefore not
explain the small effects. Even the upper end of the confidence interval of
our estimates is well below the 15 percent return reported by Harmon and
Walker (1995) and Oreopoulos (2003) for the Anglo-Saxon countries. This
suggests that the returns to a year of compulsory schooling in Germany is
very different from the returns in these earlier studies.
5 Interpretation
Why are the returns to compulsory education zero in Germany while they
are large in most other countries where these effects have been studied? In
this section we turn to a discussion of various explanations for our finding.
We feel that we can rule out some leading possibilities, and we provide some
suggestive evidence regarding a skill based explanation.
One possible explanation for the lack of wage returns might be that the
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wage setting institutions in Germany prevent the necessary adjustments to
reflect any returns. In this case, 9th grade graduates are indeed more pro-
ductive but the effects do not show up in wages. However, employers should
be more interested in employing the more productive 9th grade graduates
than the equally expensive but less productive school leavers from 8th grade.
Hence we would expect to see positive employment effects for the 9th grade.
Table 6 explores this possibility by replacing the dependent variable with
a dummy variable for whether the respondent is employed. This can only
be done in the Micro Census. The employment effects are only sizeable in
the specification with no state specific trends, but vanish once these trends
are included. The effects are even smaller or negative when the sample is
restricted to men (results for men are not shown in the table): the coefficient
is 0.003 with a standard error of 0.004 without state specific trends. Selec-
tive labor force participation is less of an issue for men. So these results
suggests that there are no employment effects of the increase in compulsory
schooling age.15
An additional implication of the wage rigidity explanation for the ab-
sence of wage returns is that 9th grade graduates should be more likely
to choose self-employment if their higher productivity is not rewarded in
the more regulated wage and salary sector. In addition, depending on
the resulting selection, self-employment wages should also be higher for 9th
grade graduates. We do not find any support for this possibility either.
Results are shown in the lower two panels of table 6. We first analyze self-
employment rates. The effects of the 9th grade are zero or negative, and
none of the coefficients is significant. The wages of self-employed workers
are also not higher for 9th grade school leavers. In fact, the coefficient
estimates are consistently negative, and some estimates are significant at
the 5 percent level. Hence, there is no evidence for higher self-employment
rates, or higher earnings among the self-employed either. Together with the
results on employment this provides fairly strong evidence against the wage
15Grenet (2004) also presents results for employment and but similarly fails to find any
effects for France.
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rigidity explanation.16
A second explanation might be that the lack of returns to the additional
grade in secondary school had no effect because of the role played by the
apprenticeship system in Germany. Most basic track students will complete
an apprenticeship. The length of apprenticeships was not adapted when the
9th grades were introduced. One simple view would be that the introduction
of the 9th grade did not really change the “highest grade completed” in
Germany, if this is the apprenticeship. A successful apprentice will in
essence have the same credential with 8 or 9 grades of school. Hence, the
German experiment is very different from forcing a US high school dropout
to complete an additional grade, and a zero return in Germany may therefore
not be surprising.
In order to probe the possibility that we do not find any returns to the 9th
grade because of the role of apprenticeship training, we investigate in table 7
whether the incidence of apprenticeship or other vocational post-secondary
training was affected by the 9th grade introduction. This only makes sense
for basic track students because upper track students have additional post-
secondary options. Hence, the samples in table 7 are restriced to basic school
students. As can be seen in the top panel, the 9th grade introduction did
not seem to have affected post-school training. The coefficients are small,
with some estimates positive, and one of them negative.
If there is no selection into who completes an apprenticeship, we can
also analyze wages for those school leavers who do not complete any post-
secondary training. This group is much more comparable to US high school
16A slightly more intricate version of the wage rigidity story would be that there are
indeed positive wage effects, but our research design is unable to pick up the effect. Wages
are frequently set through collective bargaining agreements, and there is pattern bargain-
ing in Germany. This means that the collective agreements for one sector and region
often set a pattern for other sectors and regions. In fact, the unions try fairly explicitly
to avoid the emergence of regional wage dispersion. This means that it may not have
been possible for positive state level wage differentials to emerge for the students in states
which introduced the 9th grade earlier. Instead, effects might have emerged slowly at the
national level, and these effects would be absorbed by the cohort or time effects in our
specifications. However, if this is true, we would still expect to see effects on employment
and for the self-employed.
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drop-outs or UK school leavers with no post-compulsory schooling. If the
structure of German vocational training is responsible for our results, then
we should find wage returns for this (small) subgroup of basic track leavers.
The lower panel in table 7 shows that this is not the case. If anything,
the point estimates are actually negative, although they are not significant.
Hence, an explanation of our results simply based on the training system in
Germany also seems unlikely.17
One of the most commonly advanced explanation for high returns to
compulsory schooling, particularly for the US, has focused on the idea that
there is heterogeneity in the underlying returns to schooling. In this case, IV
estimates will result in larger returns than OLS estimates if the instrument
picks out variation among high return sub-groups of the population (see
Imbens and Angrist, 1994, and Card, 1999). One interpretation of the
empirical results is that high costs of schooling prevent some low education
but high return individuals to continue in school, and there is some empirical
evidence for this interpretation (Card 1995, 2001). Possible reasons for high
costs of schooling among drop-outs may be credit constraints, psychological
costs of schooling, myopia, or special circumstances, like health or pregnancy.
One possible interpretation to reconcile our results with those for the US
may be that the drop-outs who are driving the results in US studies have
indeed high returns, while the school leavers compelled to stay on longer in
Germany are predominantly low return individuals. The US and German
school systems present youths with a rather different set of alternatives. In
17A more complicated explanation based on the German apprenticeship system might
still be consistent with our results. Say the additional knowledge acquired during the 9th
grade is being mediated by the apprenticeships, which most basic school leavers complete.
It is the human capital created by the apprenticeship, which eventually matters for labor
market outcomes. However, apprenticeships are regulated at the national level, and any
updating of the regulations, which would accommodate the additional skills of school
leavers, would show up only at the national level again. This could explain a zero return
estimate because the effect is being absorbed by our cohort dummies. Those without
apprenticeship training have no returns since 9th grade skills are not useful without the
additional training. We cannot rule out this possibility based on our evidence. However,
it would imply a very different, and highly country specific channel of returns in Germany
that is very different from the reasons for the high returns in other countries. Hence, this
is not a particularly attractive explanation to reconcile our results with the literature.
21
the US, a student has to make a decision at the school leaving age, say
at 14, 15, or 16 years of age, whether to leave school or to stay on. In
Germany, students and parents make an important decision about school
leaving effectively at age 10 or 11 when students have to choose a secondary
track. Once a student chose to stay in the basic track, that student had
no alternative to leaving school after grade 8 as long as the state had not
introduced a 9th grade. Moving up to a higher track is virtually impossible
at that stage. Of course, students in the higher tracks in Germany still have
the possibility to drop out of school once they reach the highest manadory
grade.
These differences in schooling systems imply that a small number of
students is affected by compulsory schooling laws in the US. In contrast, a
large number of students was affected by the introduction of the 9th grade
in Germany. These two groups of students are potentially quite different.
For example, Angrist and Krueger (1991) estimate that about 4 percent of
school leavers born in the 1940s and subject to an age 16 schooling leaving
age drop out as soon as they can, and are therefore directly affected by
the school leaving age. This small group of students could have both high
costs of schooling and high returns and hence be responsible for the large
returns to compulsory schooling. In our German samples, about 60 percent
of students attend the basic track during the introduction of 9th grades, and
were therefore affected by the change. Most of these individuals may be
low return students. In fact, this may be the reason they chose to remain
in the basic track at age 11.18
While early tracking offers a promising rationalization of our results, we
believe that the differences in schooling systems are more fundamental than
18Suppose 4 percent of students are high cost/high return types in both countries and
these students have a return to an additional year of schooling of 0.12. In Germany, these
students are drop-outs from one of the higher tracks. Furthermore, suppose that the
return for the basic track students in Germany is zero, and they account for 60 percent of
all students. The expected IV estimate for Germany would be in this case 0.12*0.04/(0.04
+0.6) = 0.0075. This is roughly the magnitude of the estimates we find for the full sample
in table 5. Also consistent with this explanation would be the fact that we find more
positive estimates for the full sample than for basic track students only.
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an explanation based on tracking alone would suggest. In particular, the
school system in the UK resembled the German school system much more
than the one in the US at the times of the raising of the school leaving age.
The UK school system also tracked students into two types of secondary
schools at age 11. Only students in the lower level schools (secondary
modern schools) were directly affected by the change in the school leaving
age, since students in the more academic track (Grammar schools) were
expected to continue their schooling up to age 18 in any case. According
to Oreopoulos (2003), about 50 percent of students in Great Britain were
affected by the increase in the school leaving age from 14 to 15 in 1947.
This is close to the fraction affected by the German policy change. Since
returns for the British students are high, this would have to imply that all
these British students have to have high returns to schooling. But this begs
the question why there should be such a different number of high return
students in the various countries.
We believe that an an explanation based on the skills actually learned
around the time of the compulsory school leaving age, and the relevance of
these skills for the labor market may be a likely explanation of the results.
The different schooling and training systems in different countries may play
some role in this. Suppose that workers use two types of skills, academic
skills and vocational skills. Vocational skills are learned in apprenticeship
training or on the job. In terms of academic skills, school leavers from basic
track only use the most basic skills: reading, writing, and basic arithmetic.
Our claim is then that students do not learn any of these labor market
relevant skills in the 9th grade in basic track in Germany. On the other
hand, students in other countries like the US, Canada, or the UK may still
be learning these skills even at an age like 14 or 15. This could be because
the German school system does a better job in teaching these skills earlier
than school systems in the Anglo-Saxon countries.
The QaC data set asks questions in all waves about the location where
individuals learned the skills relevant for their job. Only 6 percent of
basic school leavers name general schooling as one of the venues were these
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skills were learned. The most important venues are vocational training
and experience on the job. Even for those basic school leavers with no
further training the fraction learning skills in school is less than 8 percent.
Of course, this may not necessarily mean that none of the skills learned in
school are relevant to the labor market.
A bit more direct evidence is available in some of the waves in the QaC
data. Respondents were asked whether they used certain specific skills on
their job. Most of these skills were vocational skills or skills typically learned
in tertiary education. However, three skills were clearly skills learned in
primary or secondary schooling. These are math, German language skills,
and foreign language skills. More details about the intensity of these skills
are available on the 1979 wave of the data. Table 8 displays some results
on the usage of these academic skills. In general, it is obvious that usage of
academic skills is much higher for graduates of the higher tracks. However,
almost half of basic track respondents say they use math skills on their
job. However, the skills they actually use are basic arithmetic, and to some
extend very simple algebra (like forming percentages, calculating interest,
or solving a simple equation with one unknown). These are skills typically
learned in Germany by grade 7. Very few basic track students use any more
advanced math skills.
The disparity between basic track and higher track students is even more
apparent with respect to language skills. Only about a third of basic track
students need to communicate orally on their job or write simple letters,
while twice as many students from the higher tracks use these skills. This
is basically due to the fact that basic track leavers typically end up occupying
blue collar positions, while low level white collar positions (like secretary)
would typically be occupied by middle track students. Few basic track stu-
dents need to communicate about complex matters on their job, and hardly
any use a foreign language. Despite the fact that the basic track group
is large, this evidence corroborates our claim that they use only relatively
basic academic skills.
The second part of our claim is that students at the bottom end of the
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ability distribution in Germany are more proficient in these basic academic
skills than their peers in other countries, where higher returns to compulsory
schooling were found. Table 9 sheds some light on this issue. It presents
some results from the 1994-98 International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS),
taken from OECD (2000). The IALS is designed to assess the literacy skills
of the adult population in a variety of countries. The survey tasks are
used to construct three literacy scales for prose, document, and quantitative
literacy. The survey uses a 0 - 500 scale, and a score of 225 on any of the
scales denotes a very rudimentary mastery of the category. For example, a
quantitative IALS task associated with a score of 225 asks the respondent
to fill in the total costs including handling in an order form. The previous
two lines in the form give the cost of the item of 50, and the handling charge
of 2. There is no other distracting information.
Table 9 shows the quantitative scores at the 5th and 25th percentiles
of the distributions for the IALS countries for which studies on compulsory
schooling exist. France is not included in the OECD report. The scores at
these low percentiles are probably most relevant to assess the knowledge
of students who are likely at the margin of dropping out of school early.
Most relevant for our purpose is the age group 56-65, since the compulsory
schooling law changes date back far enough in most countries, that younger
individuals would not be affected. However, the sample sizes in the IALS are
not particularly large (a few thousand per country), and we report the results
for the whole sample as well. Table 9 reveals the well known result that
Germans at the lower end of the ability distribution score relatively highly,
particularly when compared to Anglo-Saxon countries. This is particularly
apparent at the 5th percentile, and for the older respondents. In fact, for
this group Germans also outperform the Swedes and Norwegians.19 Similar
19The Netherlands look much more like Norway and Sweden than Germany in this table,
although Oosterbeek and Webbing (2004) found zero returns to compulsory schooling for
the Netherlands as well. However, the Dutch result may well be explained by the fact that
the raising of the school leaving age affected a group of students in particular vocational
programs. Hence, basic skills may not be very relevant in explaining the different results
for the Netherlands.
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results would be obtained using the IALS prose and document scores.
Of course, in order to infer the quality of schooling across countries in the
1950s and 1960s, it might be more informative to look at data on students
during this time directly, rather than the reports on the IALS, which was
carried out with adults many years later. The earliest international com-
parison test, which contains relevant information for our case is the First
International Mathematics Study (FIMS) in 1964. This test was conducted
for 13 year olds and in the final grade in secondary school in ten coun-
tries. In table 10, we report some results for 13 year olds in six relevant
countries: Germany, the US, England, France, the Netherlands and Sweden.
The means are from scaled scores, i.e. scores that have been converted to an
international distribution with a mean of zero and standard deviation of one.
Again, it can be seen that German students score better than those from
any of the other countries. In basic arithmethic the Germans outperform
particularly those from the US, England and Sweden.
More interesting than the mean is again the distribution at the lower
end. Unfortunately, the report on the FIMS (Huse´n, 1967) does not report
percentile scores. Instead, we constructed the distribution for particpants
who answered up to 20 out of 70 items correctly. As can be seen from the
table, only 10 percent of students in Germany answered only 10 or fewer
questions, while 37 percent of Swedish, 32 percent of American, and 29
percent of English students did equally poorly. France and the Netherlands
fall inbetween these extremes.
These results broadly corroborate those from the IALS. Hence, we con-
clude that the likely explanation for the absence of any returns to compul-
sory schooling in Germany are to be found in the institutional features of
the German school system. German students had learned the labor mar-
ket relevant skills by the time they graduated from secondary school, while
in the Anglo-Saxon countries, the most marginal students are still learning
these skills at age 14 or 15. This leaves open the question whether keeping
students in school during 9th grade has other beneficial effects. Economists
have recently become interested in the effects of schooling on health, family
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formation and fertility, criminal behavior, etc. While estimating these ef-
fects would be extremely interesting, we are not able to explore these issues
with the data we have at hand.
6 Conclusion
While previous estimates of the returns to compulsory schooling are typically
in the range of 10 to 15 percent, we find that the returns to an additional
grade in Germany are basically zero. We establish this result using three
large data sets, and the results are all fairly consistent and precisely esti-
mated. It is more difficult in the German case to pin down exactly how
many grades the relevant population attended. It is clear from the data,
however, that the compulsory schooling change was effective for a large num-
ber of students, and there is no doubt that we would uncover earnings effects
of the usual magnitude in our data. Using instrumental variables rules out
the possibility that the small estimates are simply due to attenuation from
measurement error.
We have also argued that some headway can be made in understanding
why the German results differ so much from those found for other countries.
We feel that the most likely explanation is due to a different structure of
the German school system, which tracks students early and does well in
training the lower end of the ability distribution in basic academic skills (or
at least did so until the beginning of the 1970s). In contrast, there may
be potentially many students at the lower end of the ability spectrum in
other countries who still benefit from general schooling at age 14 or 15. We
do not find support for an important role of rigid wages or occupational
qualifications.
The impact of compulsory schooling laws in Germany is of substantial
interest not only because the earnings effects differ so much from the preced-
ing literature on this topic. The German schooling and vocational training
system, the structure of the labor market, and the distribution of skills
among school leavers is different than in some of the other countries where
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the impact of compulsory schooling changes have been analyzed. Hence,
our paper helps to advance our understanding which of these factors might
be important in explaining high or low returns to compulsory schooling for
particular populations. Moreover, there is essentially no evidence to date
on the causal effect of schooling in the German speaking countries with an
important apprenticeship tradition. The existing IV studies by Ichino and
Winter-Ebmer (1999, 2004) and by Becker and Siebern-Thomas (2001) fo-
cus on the differences between the various secondary tracks. Therefore,
these studies have little to say about the effects of schooling for the students
within the lower track, and our paper starts to fill this gap.
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Figure 1 
Shares of Students in Basic, Middle, and Academic Track of Secondary School 
Academic Track
Middle Track
Basic Track
 
34 
Figure 2 
Number of Years Spent in School by Basic Track Students 
 
L
e
n
g
t
h
 
o
f
 
S
c
h
o
o
l
i
n
g
Years from Intro of 9th Grade
-15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15
8.5
9
9.5
 
35 
Figure 3 
Average Number of Grades Attended by School Leavers in NRW, Hessen, RPF, and Baden-Württemberg 
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Table 1 
Introduction of 9th Grade in Basic Track of Secondary School 
 
State (Bundesland) 
First Year 
when all 
Students are 
Supposed to 
Graduate after 
9 Years 
First Birth 
Cohort with 9 
Years of 
School 
Schleswig-Holstein 1956 1941 
Hamburg 1949 1934 
Niedersachsen 1962 1947 
Bremen 1958 1943 
Nordrhein-Westphalen 1967 1953 
Hessen 1967 1953 
Rheinland-Pfalz 1967 1953 
Baden-Württemberg 1967 1953 
Bayern 1969 1955 
Saarland 1964 1949 
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Table 2 
First Stage Regressions 
 (Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 
 Dependent Variable 
 
 
Years of 
Education 
Years of 
School 
(primary + 
secondary) 
Length of 
Schooling 
(primary + 
secondary) 
Attends Basic Track 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Qualification and Career Survey 
Dummy for Cohort with  
9th Grade in Basic Track 
0.569 
(0.051) 
0.588 
(0.034) 
0.171 
(0.040) 
-0.016 
(0.011) 
-0.012 
(0.011) 
-0.021 
(0.013) 
Micro Census 
Dummy for Cohort with  
9th Grade in Basic Track 
0.568 
(0.021) 
0.548 
(0.014) --- 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.012 
(0.004) 
State Specific Cohort Trends     9 9 
State Specific Cohort Trends Squared      9 
 
Note: Number of observations is 54,126 in the Qualification and Career Survey and 750,416 in the Micro Census.  All 
regressions estimated by OLS and also include a dummy for female, a quartic in age, and the maximal sets of year dummies, 
state of residence dummies, and year of birth dummies.  The standard errors are adjusted for clusters at the state * year of birth 
level.   
38 
Table 3 
First Stage Regressions 
Qualification and Career Survey 
Dependent Variable: Length of Schooling 
 (Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 
 Full Sample  Basic Track Only 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Dummy for Cohort with  
9th Grade in Basic Track 
0.171 
(0.040) 
0.190 
(0.039) 
0.180 
(0.048) 
 0.280 
(0.040) 
0.285 
(0.033) 
0.233 
(0.037) 
Number of Observations 54,126 54,126 54,126  32,970 32,970 32,970 
State Specific Cohort Trends  9 9   9 9 
State Specific Cohort Trends Squared   9    9 
 
Note: All regressions estimated by OLS and also include a dummy for female, a quartic in age, and the maximal sets of year 
dummies, state of residence dummies, and year of birth dummies.  The standard errors are adjusted for clusters at the state * 
year of birth level. 
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Table 4 
Log Wage Regressions 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 
 OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Qualification and Career Survey 
Years of Education 0.072 (0.001) 
0.064 
(0.005) 
0.061 
(0.001) 
0.007 
(0.013) 
0.019 
(0.012) 
0.032 
(0.013) 
Micro Census 
Years of Education 0.083 (0.0004) 
0.079 
(0.002) 
0.074 
(0.001) 
0.005 
(0.006) 
0.005 
(0.005) 
0.010 
(0.005) 
Female Dummy 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Quartic in Experience 9 9     
Quartic in Age   9 9 9 9 
Year Dummies 9 9 9 9 9 9 
State of Residence Dummies 9 9 9 9 9 9 
State Specific Cohort Trends     9 9 
State Specific Cohort Trends Squared      9 
Year of Birth Dummies  9 9 9 9 9 
 
Note: Number of observations is 54,126 in the QaC and 750,416 in the Micro Census.  Years of education is instrumented with a 
dummy for cohorts with a 9th grade in basic track in the state in columns (4) to (6).  Standard errors are adjusted for clusters at 
the state * year of birth level.   
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Table 5 
Reduced Form Regressions 
Dependent Variable: Log Wage 
 (Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 
 Full Sample  Basic Track Only 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Qualification and Career Survey 
Dummy for Cohort with  
9th Grade in Basic Track 
0.004 
(0.008) 
0.010 
(0.008) 
0.019 
(0.008) 
 -0.013 
(0.010) 
-0.001 
(0.010) 
0.010 
(0.011) 
Number of Observations 54,126 54,126 54,126  32,970 32,970 32,970 
Micro Census 
Dummy for Cohort with  
9th Grade in Basic Track 
0.003 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
0.005 
(0.003) 
 0.001 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
Number of Observations 750,416 750,416 750,416  413,276 413,276 413,276 
Social Security Data 
Dummy for Cohort with  
9th Grade in Basic Track 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.005) 
 
--- --- --- 
Number of Observations 12,566 12,566 12,566     
State Specific Cohort Trends  9 9   9 9 
State Specific Cohort Trends Squared   9    9 
 
Note: All regressions estimated by OLS and also include a dummy for female, a quartic in age, and the maximal sets of year 
dummies, state of residence dummies, and year of birth dummies.  The standard errors are adjusted for clusters at the state * 
year of birth level.  Regressions for the Social Security data are WLS regressions for the cell level median of the log wage using 
cell sizes as weights. 
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Table 6 
Reduced Form Regressions for Employment, Self-Employment, and Self-Employed Wages 
Micro Census 
 (Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 
 Full Sample  Basic Track Only 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Sample: All -- Dependent Variable: Employed 
Dummy for Cohort with  
9th Grade in Basic Track 
0.007 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.003) 
 0.009 
(0.004) 
0.005 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
Number of Observations 1,225,877 1,225,877 1,225,877  752,636 752,636 752,636 
Sample: Employed – Dependent Variable: Self-Employed 
Dummy for Cohort with  
9th Grade in Basic Track 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.004 
(0.002) 
 -0.001 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
Number of Observations 750,416 750,416 750,416  413,276 413,276 413,276 
Sample: Self-Employed – Dependent Variable: Log Wage  
Dummy for Cohort with  
9th Grade in Basic Track 
-0.021 
(0.014) 
-0.020 
(0.015) 
-0.014 
(0.017) 
 -0.040 
(0.021) 
-0.030 
(0.022) 
-0.051 
(0.025) 
Number of Observations 73,426 73,426 73,426  31,142 31,142 31,142 
State Specific Cohort Trends  9 9   9 9 
State Specific Cohort Trends Squared   9    9 
 
Note: All regressions estimated by OLS and also include a dummy for female, a quartic in age, and the maximal sets of year 
dummies, state of residence dummies, and year of birth dummies.  The standard errors are adjusted for clusters at the state * 
year of birth level.   
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Table 7 
Reduced Form Regressions for Post-Secondary Training and Wages of Workers with No Training 
Micro Census – Basic Track Only 
 (Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) 
Sample: Employed -- Dependent Variable: Has Any Post-Secondary Training 
Dummy for Cohort with  
9th Grade in Basic Track 
0.006 
(0.005) 
0.007 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
Number of Observations 413,276 413,276 413,276 
Sample: No Post-Secondary Training -- Dependent Variable: Log Wage 
Dummy for Cohort with  
9th Grade in Basic Track 
-0.003 
(0.009) 
-0.006 
(0.009) 
-0.006 
(0.011) 
Number of Observations 70,209 70,209 70,209 
State Specific Cohort Trends  9 9 
State Specific Cohort Trends Squared   9 
 
Note: All regressions estimated by OLS and also include a dummy for female, a quartic in age, and the maximal sets of year 
dummies, state of residence dummies, and year of birth dummies.  The standard errors are adjusted for clusters at the state * 
year of birth level.   
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Table 8 
Primary and Secondary School Skills Used on the Job 
Qualification and Career Survey 
 
 Basic Track Higher Tracks No. of obs. 
Uses math on the job 45.5 56.7 37,198 
Arithmetic 48.4 59.7 17,291 
Simple algebra  29.4  52.6 17,291 
More advanced algebra 6.9 19.4 17,291 
Geometry 8.4 16.7 17,291 
Calculus, statistics 1.4 9.8 17,291 
Uses German knowledge of German language on the job  38.2 64.4 23,942 
Communicate orally 34.8 60.3 17,291 
Write simple letters 25.1 53.4 17,291 
Write complex text  9.6 38.3 17,291 
Communicate about complex circumstances 10.0 39.2 17,291 
Uses foreign language on the job 3.8 24.7 37,198 
 
Source: Qualification and Career Survey.  Results on math usage and foreign language usage is based on 1979, 1992 and 1999 
waves, results on knowledge of German language is based on 1979 and 1999 waves, and detailed math and German usage is 
based on 1979 wave. 
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Table 9 
Quantitative Test Scores from the 1994-98 International Adult Literacy Survey 
 
 
 Age 16 – 65  Age 56 – 65 
 Percentile 
Country 5th 25th   5th 25th  
USA 138 237  143 235 
Canada 155 247  122 192 
UK 142 231  123 205 
Germany 218 265  207 252 
Netherlands 201 261  183 241 
Sweden 216 276  188 250 
Norway 209 269  182 245 
 
Note: Scores range from 0 to 500.  Source: OECD (2000), tables 2.1 and 3.4 
45 
Table 10 
Scores on the First International Mathematics Study 
Results for 13 Year Olds 
 
 Germany US  England France Netherlands Sweden 
Mean Total 0.16 -0.35 0.05 -0.14 -0.11 -0.52 
Mean Basic Arithmetic 0.28 -0.19 -0.19 -0.12 0.12 -0.40 
0 0 2 4 1 0 1 
5 or less 4 18 19 10 7 17 
10 or less 10 32 29 22 19 37 
15 or less 21 46 40 38 33 55 
20 or less 34 60 49 54 50 70 
 
Note: The reported means are from a scaled score distribution (international mean of 0, standard deviation of 1).  Source: Husén 
(1967), tables 1.2 and 1.8 
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Appendix Table 1 
Sample Means 
(Standard Deviations in Parentheses) 
 
Variable QaC Micro Census Employed 
Micro Census  
All 
Social Security 
Data 
Survey year 1986.9 (7.0) 
1995.3 
(3.7) 
1995.4 
(3.7) 
1984.8 
(5.9) 
Year of birth 1947.1 (8.5) 
1948.7 
(7.7) 
1946.8 
(8.5) 
1945.9 
(8.8) 
Age 40.1 (10.0) 
46.0 
(7.7) 
47.9 
(8.6) 
38.9 
(10.0) 
Female 0.36 0.38 0.50 --- 
Years of Schooling 9.4 (1.7) 
9.7 
(1.8) 
9.5 
(1.7) --- 
Length of Schooling 10.0 (2.0) --- --- --- 
Years of Post-Secondary Training 2.3 (1.5) 
2.4 
(1.4) 
2.1 
(1.4) --- 
Years of Education 11.7 (2.8) 
12.1 
(2.9) 
11.6 
(2.8) --- 
Basic track: 8th grade 0.40 0.35 0.43 
Basic track: 9th grade 0.21 0.20 0.18 
Middle track: 10th grade 0.23 0.22 0.21 }  0.94 
Academic track: 12th grade 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.02 
Academic track: 13th grade 0.13 0.18 0.14 0.04 
Employed 1.00 1.00 0.70 1.00 
Self-employed --- 0.10 --- --- 
Number of observations 54,126 750,416 1,225,877 2,414,205 
 
 
